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ABSTRACT
This analysis establishes and tests conditions for con-
sistency of the post-appropriation resource allocation to
attack aircraft carriers by the Navy and plans made by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Planning
Programming Budgeting System. The Cobb-Douglas and Leontief
production functions, using carrier operating tonnage as an
output measure and Military Personnel and Operations and
Maintenance appropriation dollars as inputs, are considered
as possible models to explain the implicit economic techno-
logy used during different phases of the budgeting process.
Econometric techniques, correlation analysis and other me-
thods are used in analyzing data covering 1964 through 1973.
A conclusion is reached that the Navy post-appropriation
resource allocation did in fact alter plans made by OSD; both
Department of Defense organization and other factors are
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to report the results of
research directed toward investigating the effects of
Department of Defense (DOD) organization on budgeting on one
program element in the defense budget: Attack Aircraft
Carriers.
The problem was defined as one of determining if the
Navy's resource allocation to carriers after Congressional
budget action, hereafter referred to as the service budget,
was consistent with the resource allocation arrived at during
the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle,
hereafter referred to as the program budget, from which the
Congressional submission was prepared. Additionally, the
problem was restricted to the comparison of resource allocations
for only the operation of carriers and not for procurement.
The formal analysis is preceded by a background dis-
cussion in Section II. of the theoretical aspects of program
budgeting, a brief descriptive summary of the PPBS cycle as
practiced by DOD, and a discussion of two organizational
models used by Ruefli [17] in a paper which provided the
motivation for this investigation. Section III. is a
description of the methodology and the data used in the
analysis itself, Section IV. The analysis is conducted by
modeling and comparing the results of the budgetary actions

of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and of the
Navy as microeconomic production functions. Section V. con-
sists of a summary of the results of the analysis, conclusions
concerning apparent differences in the budgeting actions of
the Navy and OSD, and a discussion of possible explanations
for these apparent differences. Additionally, Section V.
discusses several topics for further study and research
concerning the defense budget.

II. BACKGROUND
A. THE THEORY OF PROGRAM BUDGETING.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the basic
theory of program budgeting. It is the theory to be discus-
sed in this section which led the author to conclude that
resource allocations in the defense budget process, with
regard to attack carriers, might be susceptible to modeling
via a production function and that differences between
decisions at the OSD and service level might be analyzed by
estimating a production function for each level.
The term "program budgeting" has many definitions. As
McKean and Anshen [16 , p. 286] point out, to some people it
means a multiyear budget, to others it means the use of cost
utility analysis, and to others it means both of these together
with a, "re-structuring of budgeting exhibits, accumulating
costs in more meaningful categories." As Wildavsky [23,
p. 302] points out,
Program budgeting has no standard definition. The
general idea is that budgeting decisions should be
made by focusing an output categories like govern-
ment goals, objectives, end products or programs
instead of inputs like personnel, equipment and
maintenance.
The basic concepts are best conveyed by examining the
structure of the accounts, called the program structure. A
The following discussion is based on Ref. 18.

program structure for an organization such as the Department
of Defense (DOD) which produces multiple outputs can be
formed by grouping activities producing substitutive outputs
together under one program. These activities are called
program elements. For example B-52's, Titan ICBM's and
Polaris submarines all produce substitutive outputs and can
2be grouped under the program Strategic Offense. Hitch [8,
p. 32] described the building of a program structure in
the following way,
The problem was to sort out all the myriad programs
and activities of the defense establishment and
re-group them into meaningful program elements,
i.e. integrated combinations of men, equipment
and installations whose effectiveness can be
related to our national security objectives.
A typical program structure might look something like
the following:
Program 1
Program Element (PE) 1-1








2Other important considerations in putting together a
program are discussed by Smithies [18, p. 24-60].

The program structure for the organization depicted above
contains three programs, that is the organization has three
missions or outputs. Two substitutive program elements are
grouped under Program 1, three under Program 2 and two under
Program 3.
Program budgeting is not just the structure of the accounts,
however, rather it involves the allocation of resources
(or inputs) to the various program elements based, first of
all, on their contribution to the effectiveness or output of
the program element. Suppose given amounts of resources A
and B are allocated to Program 1. A program budget seeks
to maximize the effectiveness of the mix of PE 1-1 and 1-2
by allocating resources A and B to these program elements in
such a way that the marginal product of A for PE 1-1 equals
the marginal product of A for PE 1-2, and the marginal pro-
duct of B for PE 1-1 equals the marginal product of B for
PE 1-2. Resource allocation under programs budgeting within a
program is based on a goal of optimizing the effectiveness
of the program (provided the program elements within a pro-
gram are producing substitutive outputs) . Resource alloca-
tion between programs is more difficult since it involves
comparisons of outputs which are not substitutes for each
other, such as strategic offense and tactical air power.
This allocation depends not only on the marginal productivities
of the resources but also on the preferences of a decision
maker for the various non-substitutive outputs, i.e. the
utility of the outputs produced by the program elements in
different programs.

In the analysis that follows in this paper, the inputs
A and B which will be used are composite commodities or
inputs, military personnel dollars and operations and main-
tenance dollars. The program element which will be examined
is a program element under the General Purpose Forces program,
Attack Aircraft Carriers. The specification of the inputs
and the output will be discussed in Section III. A.
The preceding discussion has emphasized the resource
allocation problem which program budgeting is designed to
address. It should be clear that to do program budgeting and
in order to optimally allocate resources, production functions
of some kind for the program elements must be known or
assumed by the budgeting authority. Hitch [8, p. 27, 28],
in discussing program budgeting in the early sixties,
emphasized this point when he said,
Secretary McNamara made it known that he wanted
to manage the defense output in terms of meaning-
ful entities - of 'outputs* like the B-52 forces,
the Polaris force, the Army Airborne Division
forces, etc., associating with each all the inputs
of equipment, personnel, supplies, facilities
and funds regardless of the appropriation account
in which each was financed. He wanted to know and
indeed would have to know in order to optimize the
allocation of resources, the cost of, for example,
a B-52 wing - not only the cost of equipping the
wing but also the cost of manning and operating
the wing for its lifetime or at least for a
reasonable period of years in the future. Only
then would he be in a position to assess the cost
and effectiveness of a B-52 wing as compared with




Specification of a production function for attack
carriers and estimation of its parameters will be an
important part of this analysis and will be discussed
further in Section III.
B. THE BUDGET PROCESS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The major question addressed by this paper deals with
consistency of OSD and Navy decisions at different stages
of the budget cycle. Before addressing this question,
some background discussion on the DOD budget process is
necessary in order to identify the points at which consistency
of decisions will be examined.
During the 1960's program budgeting became well
entrenched in the budgeting process of the federal govern-
ment in general and in that of the DOD in particular. As
discussed earlier, the system was designed to inject a
greater degree of rationality into the federal government's
resource allocation process through the identification and
specification of objectives and through the use of analytical
techniques to facilitate tradeoffs between defense programs
and program elements.
When former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
his Comptroller for the Department of Defense, Charles Hitch,
took over the department in January 1961, they sought to
introduce program budgeting into the defense resource
allocation process by means of a three-phase program budget
cycle. Since its inception in DOD, the program budgeting
11

cycle, generally known as the PPB cycle, has undergone many
changes in procedure during both the McNamara and Laird-
Packard eras of administration, however, the timing of the
different phases and their purposes seem to have remained
constant. The following description of the budget process,
extracted from Refs. 2, 3 and 17, constitutes an overview
of the general budget process as it was conducted during
both administrations.
The planning phase was conducted during the period 18-24
months preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which
the budget was being prepared. This phase consisted primarily
of threat analysis conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , as well as
initial estimates of the forces required to meet these
threats.
The programming phase occurred during the approximate
period 9-18 months preceding the fiscal year. This phase
may be described as a dialogue between OSD and the services
which was concerned primarily with the selection of programs,
program elements, and force levels.
The concept of programs and program elements was discussed
in the previous section and a complete listing of the ten
major programs appears in Appendix A, Defense Programs and
Appropriations. In order to understand the concept of force
level, it is only necessary to refer to Hitch [8, p. 32].
12

Wherever possible, program elements are measured
in physical terms such as numbers of aircraft per
wing, numbers of operational missiles on launchers,
number of active ships...
These numbers are what is meant by the term force
levels
.
The end product of the programming phase was the Five
Year Defense Plan (FYDP) which contained DOD ' s updated list
of programs, program elements, force levels, and attendant
resources not only for the ensuing fiscal year but for the
following four years as well. It should be noted that this
phase emphasized the program nature of the defense budget
through coordination across service lines and the determination
and evaluation of tradeoffs among defense programs and
program elements.
The budgeting phase occurred during the October through
December period immediately preceding the submission of the
budget to the Congress in January. Up to this point the
budget was considered in a program format, but it was now
crosswalked (costed out) into the traditional appropriation
format for submission to the Congress.
The term crosswalk refers to the process of aggregating
the resources needed by the program elements into resource
categories. This aggregation is necessary first of all
because the Congress examines the defense budget in terms of
the resource categories Military Personnel, Operations and
Maintenance, Procurement/ etc., a complete listing of which
appears in Appendix A. Secondly, the Department of Defense
13

also manages to some extent in terms of resources. For
example, DOD manages the acquisition, training, and careers
of military personnel. Crosswalking involves going through
all program elements and summing up, for example, the
military personnel or operations and maintenance dollars
they require at the approved force levels. This information
on each program element is stored with the Program Element
Summary Data and contains the approved force levels and the
resources required by that program element. Appendix B,
Program Element Summary Data is an example of a hypothetical
program element.
This brief description concludes the process that most of
the literature on the subject considers to be the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) . Two phases of the
defense budget process subsequent to the three already men-
tioned have a great deal of influence on the actual operation
and implementation of the overall defense program.
During the fourth phase the defense budget, as submitted
to the Congress in. the January preceding the beginning of
the fiscal year in July, is acted upon by the Congress in
the same format that it is submitted: In appropriation or
resource categories.
The fifth phase is conducted by the services after the
defense budget is enacted into law. This phase requires
another crosswalk to allocate the appropriations to programs
and program elements, e.g., the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN)
14

appropriation must be broken down into MPN for strategic
forces and MPN for general purpose forces (programs) and
further into MPN allocations for submarines, destroyers,
aircraft carriers, etc. This crosswalk shows how the service
plans to apply the cuts made by the Congress in resource
categories to the program elements. The crosswalk is done
by the services; specific discussion of the documents and
authorities involved in this crosswalk is contained in the
Department of the Navy RDT&E Management Guide [5, p. 4-7].
The difference in the two crosswalks (the budgeting
phase crosswalk and the allocation phase crosswalk) is con-
siderable both in concept and practice. The budgeting phase
crosswalk is aggregative. Since all programs and program
elements list the requested appropriations, the crosswalk
is executed by summing by appropriations across all programs
and program elements. The allocation phase crosswalk is
disaggregative. Since the Congressionally approved
appropriations may be different from that which was requested,
decisions must be made as to which programs and program
elements are to receive cuts in their requested appropriations.
The chronological sequence of events in the defense bud-
get process raises the question of whether or not decisions
made in the first three phases (decisions which are coordinated
by OSD) are consistent with decisions made by the Navy in the
fifth phase. The next section will briefly discuss research
done by Timothy W. Reufli [17] which indicates that it is
likely that the services will alter plans made by OSD.
15

C. EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION ON PPBS
According to Ruefli [17, p. 161], prior to 1971 most of
the literature on PPBS was advocative in nature, dealing pri-
marily with potential uses of the system in improving the
decision making process. Ruefli departed from this approach
and developed a complex goal programming model to describe
and evaluate PPBS.
One of several conclusions Ruefli arrived at was that
organization structure has significant effects upon the PPBS
process, specifically upon the resulting resource allocations
3
and defense force structure . He arrived at this conclusion
by applying his Generalized Goal Decomposition model to two
different tri-level organization models. The first organiza-
tion model consisted of OSD as the central unit (organization
level one) , mission oriented defense programs as the manage-
ment units (organization level two) , and program elements as
the operating units (organization level three) . The second
organization model was the same with the exception of the ser-
vice bureaucracies (Army, Navy, Air Force) replacing the
defense programs as the management units. As noted earlier,
the different organizations yielded different results, speci-
fically in 10 of 12 different resource allocation and force
level measurements that Ruefli analyzed for a sample problem.
3
Ruefli [17, p. 172] additionally stated that the lack of
previous analytical models for studying PPBS may, "be regarded
as a sympton...of the avoidance of organization considerations
on the part of the advocates of PPBS," and also noted the com-




For this analysis, an analogy was constructed
between
the two organization models used by Ruefli
and the DOD budget
process described in Section II. B. Ruefli' s first
organiza-
tion model with defense programs at the management
level,
corresponds to the organization structure used in the
plan-
ning, programming and budgeting phases, phases one
through
three of the DOD budget process. The appropriation
alloca-
tion process (phase five of the DOD budget process)
conducted
by the services to allocate the Congressionally
approved
appropriations to the programs and program elements is
analogous to Ruefli' s second organization model in which
the
services occupy the management level.
The implication of Ruefli ' s aforementioned conclusion
applied to the DOD budget process through this analogy
is
that the plans and programs made prior to submission to
the
Congress may be changed not only by Congressional action
but
also by the allocation process conducted by the service
after
the Congress acts.
Using data on attack carriers this analysis attempts
to
test if this change occurs, as Ruefli concluded that
it
might, in DOD. Also, if the change appears to have
occurred,
the reasons or explanations for the change will be advanced.
17

III. METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION ON PPBS
The conclusion concerning the effects of organization on
PPBS arrived at by Ruefli [17] was based primarily on the
results of a hypothetical sample problem; however, it is
the purpose of this paper to investigate the conclusion as
it pertains to an actual DOD problem.
Based on the discussion of program budgeting in Section
II. A. it is apparent that budgeting authorities possess at
least an implicit production function. A more explicit de-
scription of the production function may be gained by observing
that when a budgeting authority specifies x and y inputs to
produce an output of z, he is explicitly specifying a point
on the production surface z = f(x,y). By estimating the
4program budget's and service budget's production functions
from a series of these explicitly specified production surface
points, comparisons may be made between the two production
functions to determine if the Navy and OSD perceive the same
technology for the production of operating attack aircraft
carriers.
4
Henceforth in the analysis, the term program budget will
refer to the programs, program elements, force levels and re-
sources determined during phases one through three of the
PPB cycle. The term service budget will refer to the similar




A necessary condition for the service budget not to
change the plans made under the program budget is the agree-
ment of the service budget's production function for carriers
with that of the program budget. In other words, if the Navy
perceives a different technology for the production of
carriers, or possibly a different output measure, from that
which was used to formulate the program budget prior to
Congressional consideration, then the plans made under the
program budget structure would inevitably be changed during
the allocation process.
A. SPECIFICATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
1. Operational Definitions of Inputs and Outputs .
The inputs into the production process under consider-
ation are numerous and difficult to measure in physical terms,
however, they may be measured in dollar terms aggregated into
appropriation categories as was done by Sovereign [19, p. 9].
Because procurement was not considered a pertinent input to
the operation of carriers, only the appropriations Military
Personnel, Navy (MPN) and Operations and Maintenance, Navy
(OMN) were used.
The output measurement imposed a greater problem.
The number of carriers operated was an obvious measure of
output but was deceptive in so far as effectiveness was
concerned. During the past decade the Essex/Hancock class
carriers were replaced by the newer and larger Forrestal/Kitty
19

Hawk class and the Enterprise. While replacement was approx-
imately on a 1:1 ratio, in some sense effectiveness increased,
as did the operating costs, e.g., the capability of the Kitty
Hawk class carriers to handle the A- 6 aircraft gave them an
all weather attack capability that the Hancock class lacked.
A second measurement problem for output is the depen-
dence of effectiveness upon mission. Since carriers have a
multi-mission capability, an effectiveness measure should
5probably take into account the mission and scenario .
For the purpose of this analysis, total operating
tonnage was used as a compromise output measure. Tonnage
was more representative of overall effectiveness than was
total number of carriers, and was simple to derive. Had
data been available on an activity level which the carrier
force was expected to achieve such as the number of nautical
miles steamed, a superior measure of output would have been
ton-miles steamed, especially for modeling the Navy's allo-
cation phase. As will be discussed in more detail in Section
IV.C, based on the analysis, tonnage appears to be the
measure of carrier output which OSD uses in the program bud-
get i however, an activity level (such as nautical miles steamed
or sorties launched) is in all likelihood an important
consideration during the Navy's allocation phase.
5Consider the differences in effectiveness of the Hancock
and Kitty Hawk. If the mission is to "show the flag" in
foreign ports, effectiveness of the two would be approximately
equal. However, if the mission involved launching combat
sorties, the Kitty Hawk would be more effective due to a
larger air wing of more sophisticated aircraft.
20

2 . Functional Forms .
Two alternative functional forms for the production
function were considered to be of potential use in describing
the data: The Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production functions
A primary difference in the two is the unrestricted substi-
tution, from a strictly technological viewpoint, between
inputs to produce a fixed output in the Cobb-Douglas and the
fixed relationship or non-substitutability among inputs in
the Leontief model.
The two different functional forms were used because,
as will be discussed in Section V.
,
good arguments exist to
justify the use of each of them. Rather than limit the
results by depending on only one functional specification,
the author elected to analyze the problem for both the
Cobb-Douglas and Leontief functions.
a. Cobb-Douglas Production Function
The Cobb-Douglas production function is a commonly
used functional form which has been used to describe many
different production processes. For defense output, it has
been used by Sovereign [19] to describe the operation of
destroyers and by Lewis [15] to describe the output of Naval
Air Stations.
Klein, L. R. , Econometrics
,
p. 202, Row Peterson, 1956.
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In terms of the variables in this analysis the
function can be written as:
T = A(MPN) a (OMN)
^
where T is carrier tonnage,
MPN and OMN are appropriatons for carriers,
A is an efficiency parameter,
and a and 3 are elasticity parameters for MPN and OMN.
If constant returns to scale is desired, the
following model may be used:
T = A(MPN) a (OMN) 1
"
Ct
b. Leontief Production Function
The Leontief production function is another commonly
used functional form of the production function, especially
within the Department of Defense. It has been used in the
Navy Resource Model (NARM) , the Electric FYDP cost model, and
by Sovereign [19] to describe the operation of destroyers.
In terms of the variables of this problem, the
model takes the form:
. . ,MPN OMN,
T = minimum ( , —s—-)
a b
where T is carrier tonnage,
MPN and OMN are appropriations for carriers,
7
and a and b, are parameters.
7
"a" and "b" may be interpreted as follows: for






— is the marginal product of MPN, and the marginal
MPN OMN 1 •product of OMN is zero. For > —r— , r- is the marginal product




The data on number and class of carriers and MPN and OMN
in millions of dollars, unadjusted for inflation, for both
the program budget and the service budget for the years
1964 through 1973 were obtained from the Department of the
Navy Program Information Center. The data base was extracted
from successive January updates of the Five Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) computer outputs. The program budget data were
extracted from the budget year column, e.g., from the January
1970 FYDP output, the 1971 program budget data were extracted
from the column labeled FY71 and the 197 service budget data
were extracted from the column labeled FY7 0. The data
extracted in this manner reflect (from the January 197
output) the fiscal year 1971 budget after completion of
phases one through three, and the fiscal year 1970 budget
g
after completion of phase five .
The data were incomplete for one year in both budgets.
For 1967 the program budget contains only Essex/Hancock and
Midway class data. The same data deficiency occurs in the
1966 service budget. The incomplete data in no way affected
the estimation procedures, since they were valid points on the
production surface, and, except where otherwise noted, the
analysis included the data for the incomplete years.
o
Congressional action on Defense Appropriations is usually
not completed unitl October, over three months after the
beginning of the fiscal year.
23

The number and class of carriers were converted to
operating tonnage (in thousands) using the table in Appendix
C, Aircraft Carrier Tonnage Conversion, which was derived
from Jane's Fighting Ships [10, p. 433-445].
The appropriations were converted to constant 1969
dollars using Appendix D, Military Price Indices, which was
derived from OSD (Comptroller) approved price indices in
Ref. 6.
A complete listing of the data base is contained in
Appendix E, Data Base (U) , classified SECRET, which has been




A. ESTIMATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTION PARAMETERS
1. Estimation of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function .
The Cobb-Douglas function was estimated under the
assumption of constant returns to scale. This is a reasonable
assumption due to the consideration that both MPN and OMN
for carriers do not contain any appreciable degree of fixed
costs / and the consideration of the type of basic inputs in
the appropriation categories. MPN contains resources such
as pay and allowances for the assigned personnel, and OMN
contains resources such as fuel, spare parts and funds for
civilian personnel involved in maintenance and overhauls.
The resources required in these categories should vary
directly with the force size operated. Additionally, the
elimination of one parameter increases the number of degrees
of freedom by one, an especially desirable consequence when
the number of data points is limited.
Due to the stochastic nature of the production process,
an exponentially multiplicative error term was introduced into
the model described in Section II. A. 2. a. to represent the
prediction errors. By making a logarithmic transformation,
rearranging the terms and making the classical statistical
assumptions for the stochastic disturbance, the parameters
of the production function may be estimated by using ordinary
least squares as suggested by Zellner, Kmenta , and Dreze [24].
25

T = A(MPN) a (OMN) 1_ae e
£n(T) = InA + a £n(MPN) + (1-a) Jtn (OMN) + E
£n(T) - £n(OMN) = £nA + a £n(MPN) - a £n(OMN) + e
*n W = lnA + a ln W + e
The following estimates resulted:
T MPN
tn W = 1 - 782 + °; 8 | 42) £n (5mI>
The standard error of this estimate was 0.054 and the coef-
2ficient of determination R = .915. This regression resulted
in the following estimated Cobb-Douglas function:
T = 5.942 (MPN) ' 854 (OMN) 0,146
The Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale
was similarly estimated for the data from the service budget
with the following results:
T MPN
and the following estimated equation:
T = 5.008 (MPN) 1,074 (OMN)" 0,74
While the standard error of the estimate is .042 and the
2
coefficient of determination R is .965, the elasticities are
quite surprising. The negative elasticity -.074 implies that
as OMN is increased, output decreases. An alternative explanation
9
is that this elasticity is not statistically different from zero.
9To insure that the negative elasticities were not a result
of the constant returns to scale assumption, the same data were
used to estimate the Cobb-Douglas function without the restriction
on scale. The resulting estimates of MPN and OMN elasticities
were 1.114 and -0.042 with standard errors of 0.080 and 0.078.
These were essentially the same results as with constant returns
to scale, indicating that the scale restriction is not the
cause of this somewhat unexpected result.
26

Because time series data were used to estimate these
equations, it was desired to test against autocorrelation of
the error terms. The Durbin-Watson statistic is perhaps the
best known test for autocorrelation, however values of the
test statistic are tabled only for values of n £ 15. Since
extrapolation of these statistics to n = 10 may have led to
erroneous results, a less sophisticated method of examining
the possibility of autoreggressive bias was selected. A
sample coefficient of correlation was computed between the
successive error terms in both regressions (program budget
and service budget). The resulting coefficients were 0.14
(program budget) and -0.51 (service budget). The hypothesis
that the error terms in both regressions are uncorrelated
cannot be rejected at the .10 level of significance. Due
to the results of this test, it was assumed that the analysis
was not confounded by first order autoregressive bias.
Given the estimates for the parameters of the production
functions under the program and service budgets, the Chow
test described by Johnston [11, p. 136, 137] was performed
to determine if a hypothesis that these parameters were the
same could be rejected.
Under the null hypothesis that the service budget
parameters are the same as the program budget parameters, the
appropriate test statistic is an "F" statistic with 2 and 16
degrees of freedom in the numerator and denominator. The
test statistic was calculated to be 5.77. The critical
region at the .05 level of significance is F > 3.63, hence
27

the null hypothesis is rejected. The statistical interpre-
tation of this test is that if the two production functions
are the same, there is only a 5% chance that a test statistic
this large or larger would be observed. Consequently there
is statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis and
it is concluded that if the Cobb-Douglas function is the
correct functional form for the program budget, then identical
production functions are not being employed during phases one
through three (program budget phase) and phase five (service
budget allocation phase) of the defense budget process.
2. Estimation of the Leontief Production Function .
The Leontief model described in Section III. A. 2. b.
was estimated using the following model suggested by
Klein [12, p. 134]
:
MPN , OMN .
—
= a + e
a
and — " b + eb
Under the assumption that the error terms e and e, are
a b
normally distributed with zero means and respective variances
„
2 a 2 MpN a OMN . , . ., - . 1 ...a and a, , —=— and —— are also distributed normally with
2 2
means a and b and variances a and a, . The estimation
a b
procedure is simply to estimate the means a and b and the
2 2
sample variances a and a, using sample means and sample
variances. The following estimates resulted from this














A statistical test was conducted to determine if the
parameters of the production function for the program budget
data were the same as those for the service budget data.
The null hypotheses tested were that a__ = a^ and b__. = b 01-.,
where the subscripts PB and SB denote the parameters of the
program budget and service budget production functions.
Testing for equality between means"" of two normal
populations in the presence of unknown and unequal variances
constitutes an unsolved statistical problem known as the
Behrens-Fischer problem. However, Welch [22] states that the
following statistic with an approximate "t" distribution may
be used as an approximation to test the hypothesis:
/\ .a
fc =
(aPB " aSB }
a
"2 "2
°a 'PB °a 'PB
NPB NSB
where N_. D and N_,_. represent the number of sample points in
each population. An identical test statistic with b replacing
a in the subscripts and estimates is applicable to testing
the hypothesis that b__, = bCD . Under the null hypothesis,
the test statistic is distributed approximately "t" with the





















: aBP " aSB
t = 2.766
a
V bPB = bSB
t. = 1.460b
NPB NSB
The following test statistics and approximate degrees of
freedom were computed for both null hypotheses with the degrees
of freedom rounded to the nearest integer:
df = 20
df = 16
For the first hypothesis with 20 degrees of freedom and
a significance level of .02 , the critical values of the "t"
distribution are + 2.528. Since t = 2.766 > 2.528 the hypothesis
that a
pfi
= agB is rejected.
For the second hypothesis with 16 degrees of freedom and
the same significance level, the critical values are +2.583.
However, since -2.583 < t, < 2.58 3, the hypothesis that
bpR = b cannot be rejected.
While the two individual hypotheses that apB = a_B and
bpB = b_ R have both been tested, it still remains to test
the single hypothesis that the production function of the
program budget is the same as that of the service budget.
This is equivalent to testing that both a = a„ and bpB = bgB .
If the estimates for a^-, and b^-, . , , ,PB PB were independent and
the estimates for a-. D and b.,,-. were independent, it wouldbh) bB
These hypotheses were tested at the .02 level of significance
to provide the basic results from which to test a broader
hypothesis that both a ni3 = aOD and bnTi = bOD further on in this
section. PB SB PB SB
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be a simple matter of invoking the properties of independent
random variables. However/ these estimates, are not indepen-
dent because each used the same measure of output, i.e.,
MPN
PBthe estimates for apR used —
=





, each with a common factor of TpR .
PB
A rejection region for the single hypothesis may
be constructed by using the following argument presented by
Theil [20, p. 132] , on the similar subject of simultaneous
confidence regions. Under the two null hypotheses that
3PB
= aSB and that bPB
= bSB'
Pr(t eA ) = 1 - a and Pr(t, eA, ) = 1 - a,
a a a b b b
where A and A, are the acceptance regions (more formally
the non-rejection regions) and a and a, are the significance
levels, .02 in this case, for each test. Under the null
hypotheses that a = a and b = bg , the appropriate
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= 1 - Pr(t
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This probabilistic argument indicates that under
the null hypothesis that the production functions are
equivalent, i.e., that a = a and b = b„ , the proba-
bility of both t statistics, t and t, , falling in their
a d
respective acceptance-, regions is greater than .95; or
conversely the probability of one or both test statistics
falling outside the region is less than .05. Since the null
hypothesis that a = a„B was rejected at the .02 level of
significance, the broader hypothesis that the production
functions are the same is rejected at the .05 level of
significance the same level used in the Cobb-Douglas case.
In the previous section, it was determined that if
a Cobb-Douglas production function was the appropriate produc-
tion function for describing resource allocations to carriers,
then plans made in phasesone through three of the budget process
were being altered in phase five. The analysis of this
section has arrived at the same conclusion if the Leontief
production function is the correct functional form.
B. AN EXAMINATION OF BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CARRIER
PROGRAM ELEMENT
In Section III. A., under the assumption that a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
described the data, the estimated elasticities for MPN and
OMN were 0.854 and 0.146 respectively. The elasticity for
a particular input is the percentage change in output which
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would result from a given percentage change in that input
alone. In interpreting the program budget, the elasticities
yield some insight into the relative importance that OSD
places on these inputs, in this case it appears that OSD
views MPN as considerably more important than OMN for the
carrier program elements.
Given service freedom in allocating budget cuts, it
would appear that if the Navy's point of view at all corres-
ponds to the OSD point of view, then the service would want
to concentrate an appropriation or resource cut in a program
element with low elasticity (such as the carrier program
element with an OMN elasticity of 0.146) and place emphasis
on maintaining or increasing the level of a resource in a
program element with a high elasticity.
In the light of these considerations an attempt was
made to investigate if there was any consistent linear
relationship between the cuts made in the defense budget
by the Congress and the cuts allocated to carriers by the
Navy
.
The two years 1966 and 1967 were disregarded due to
deficiencies in the data noted in Section III.B. Additionally,
the data for 1971, 1972 and 1973 were also disregarded because
in those years the output measure for tonnage was changed in
the service budget from that which appeared in the program
budget, and the effects of this change in output could not
be removed from the data without introducing estimation errors.
Remaining were five years, 1964-1965 and 1968-1970.
33

For these five years, the percentage changes in the
defense budget imposed by the Congress in the MPN and OMN
appropriations were computed using successive editions of
the Appendix to the Budget of the United States [1] . These
percentage changes (Congressional changes) were then compared
to the Navy's allocation of the cuts to the carrier program
element. The percentage changes in the MPN and OMN allocation
for the carrier program element, from the program budget
(from which the budget request was prepared for submission to
Congress) to the service budget, were also computed. This
data appears in Appendix F, Appropriation Percentage Changes.
Sample coefficients of correlation were computed
between the Congressional percentage changes in MPN and OMN
in the overall Navy budget and the service percentage changes
for both MPN and OMN in the carrier program element. The
computed coefficients were -.33 for MPN and +.34 for OMN.
If the cuts imposed by both the Congress and the
service are normally distributed random variables, a test
on the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero
may be performed as described by Dixon and Massey [4, p. 204].
The critical values tabled by Dixon and Massey [4 p. 569] call
for rejection of the null hypothesis if the sample coefficient
is outside the range (-.81, +.81) at the .10 level of significance.
In fact, at the .50 level of significance (a 50-50 chance of
This is an extension of the assumption made by Crecine
and Fischer [2] that budget cuts are made by "rules of thumb"
which are statistically predictable.
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rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) the hypothesis
cannot be rejected (critical values of +.4 0). Examination of
the data may be more revealing than the above computations.
When the data below, with the addition of the years
1971 and 1972 , are closely examined, two observations appear
to be relevant.
YEAR CVA MPN12 TOT MPN13 CVA OMN12 TOT OMN13
1964 -4.2 -2.3 +2.7 -0.7
1965 -0.1 -0.3 -8.3 -0.5
1968 +7.2 -0.9 +31.6 -1.1
1969 +5.0 -2.4 -7.6 -6.1
1970 + 9.6 -3.5 + 0.4 -6.4
14197i x * +4.5 -0.8 +4.7 -1.6
I-?14 +11.9 +4.8 +8.5 + 0.9
12CVA MPN and CVA OMN represent the percentage changes
made by the Navy in the program budget's MPN and OMN
allocations to carriers to arrive at the service budget.
TOT MPN and TOT OMN represent the percentage changes
made by the Congress in the requested defense budget.
14
The operating tonnage for years 1971 and 197 2 was
changed in the service budget by -4.7% and +4.8% respectively




The first observation is the exceedingly large
increase in OMN allocated by the Navy to carriers in 1968
in the face of a small overall decrease in OMN by the Congress.
It should be noted that fiscal year 1968 (corresponding to
the calendar period July 1967 through June 1968) was a
year of heavy United States involvement in Southeast Asia
in which carriers played a major role.
The second observation is the trend toward increased
allocation to carriers of both OMN and MPN since 1968 in the
face of general cuts by the Congress.
These observations tend to support an argument that
the FYDP (which is cast in terms of physical force units)
does not consider proposed activity levels while the Navy's
allocation process does, i.e., the Navy is allocating
resources to a different output from that being considered
by OSD. This may have caused the estimation of the negative
elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas function when it was applied
to the service budget data in that the service budget produc-
tion function was probably specified incorrectly. At phase
five of the budget process, the Navy has a relatively clear
idea of what its operating requirements for carriers
are going to be in the next ten to twelve months. Consequently,
it is most likely allocating resources to the carrier program
element for an output like ton-miles steamed rather than
total tonnage which OSD maintains in FYDP program element
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summary data files and apparently budgets for. Put another
way, OMN and MPN are allocated for the production of carrier
tonnage during phases one through three (the program budget
phase) and for the production of a different output such
as ton-miles steamed during phase five.
Another possibility which the data support is that
the Navy values the defense output of carriers more than
does OSD.
Either or both of these arguments are consistent with
the conclusion arrived at by Ruefli [17, p. 203, 204] that
different organization structures will not only lead to
different resource allocations, but will also lead to
different activities or outputs of the operating units.
Ruefli [17, p. 204] goes on to state that some type
of control mechanism (crossover network) is required to
insure that, in the terms of this paper, the service alloca-
tion in phase five of the budget cycle is consistent with
the plans made in phases one through three with regard to
both resource allocation and program element activity level.
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V. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Under the assumption that either a Cobb-Douglas or
Leontief production function describes the budgeting for the
operation of carriers, the hypothesis that the program and
service budgets are the same can be statistically rejected
at a high (.05) level of significance. Also, an examination
of percentage cuts likewise fails to indicate that service
behavior, after Congressional action, is consistent with
the plans made under the program budget. Of course, the
tests conducted were dependent upon making the correct
functional specification of the production function. In
this case it seems reasonable to assume that one of the
models does in fact correctly specify the production process.
The Cobb-Douglas function has been widely used to describe
15
many different production processes, and the linear Leontief
model is used extensively in DOD planning.
This paper set out to determine if the Navy's resource
allocation to carriers in the service budget was consistent
with the resource allocation arrived at by OSD in the program
budget. The analysis was able to conclude that the two resource
Klein [12, p. 91] noted that C. W. Cobb and P. H. Douglas





allocations were not the same. Additionally there is evidence
though less conclusive, that the Navy budgets for a higher
carrier activity level than does OSD.
It would be hasty to conclude that these results confirm
the conclusion arrived at by Ruefli [17] that the cause of the
difference is the DOD organization structure. As stated in
Section III, "A necessary condition for the service budget not
to change the plans made under the program budget is the agree-
ment of the service budget's production function for carriers
with that of the program budget. " It follows that the
results of the analysis indicate that the allocation process
which defines the service budget has changed the plans made
in the program budget. While differences in organization
structure is the vehicle that permitted these plans to be
changed, factors other than organization may have influenced
the changes or necessitated them.
B. EXPLANATION OF RESULTS OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
The years covered by the data (1964-1973) were a period
of considerable turmoil in national security due to the
Southeast Asian situation in which carriers played a large
role. With regard to budgeting during this period, it should
be kept in mind that there was a time lag of roughly a full
year between the formulation of the program and service
budgets. The oft-repeated phrase "light at the end of the
tunnel" may have had the effect of influencing the program
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budget to underestimate the resources which were actually
required for the following fiscal year. At the time the
service budget was formulated, approximately a full year after
the program budget was formulated, it may have been necessary
for the service to inject additional resources into the pro-
gram element to meet operational requirements because the "end
of the tunnel" had not yet materialized. This points up what
is essentially uncertainty in the PPBS, moreover uncertainty
would be present in any long range planning system used by
DOD. Even the allocation phase includes provisions for
uncertainty through the use of reprogramming which permits
resources to be shifted between programs and program elements
during the fiscal year as the necessity becomes evident.
A second possible reason for disagreement between the two
budgets is a tentative hypothesis of downward inelasticity of
defense force levels. Consider a hypothetical situation in
which DOD proposes to operate 10 force units using x and y
inputs. If the inputs (appropriations) are each cut by 10%,
a decision may be made to operate all 10 force units using
only 90% of the proposed inputs (each force unit operating at
90% of its full effectiveness) rather than 9 force units, each
operated at 100% effectiveness. A behavioral assumption
based on this reasoning is realistic if DOD is considered
to have a secondary objective of maintaining a base for
This behavioral trait was attributed to former Secretary




mobilization. As applied to aircraft carriers, the expected
cost of putting one ship into mothballs and then reactivating
it a year later would be quite high, not to mention the cost
of not having it available if it was urgently needed, if the
uncertainty of its requirement in near future years was high.
Both of these factors stated would have been susceptible
to analysis if an improved and consistent measure of output
or effectiveness were available. With regard to the uncer-
tainty of and the time lag between the formulation of the
budgets, if an activity level for which each budget was for-
mulated had been known (such as operating days at sea or
nautical miles steamed) then the output measure would have
better reflected the true capability budgeted for, if OSD
or the service were in fact budgeting for that output. With
regard to maintaining a mobilization base, a similar benefit
would have accrued knowing that the 10 hypothetical force
units were being operated at only 90% of full effectiveness.
With regard to consistency of the output measure, there
is some evidence that OSD and the Navy may in fact be using
different output measures, i.e., OSD appears to be using
tonnage as the output measure while the Navy resource alloca-
tion phase very well may be using either explictly or implicitly
a tonnage activity level. This is as much a problem in
the application of PPBS as it is an organization problem.
With regard to this problem Hitch [8, p. 32] is requoted:
"Wherever possible, program elements are measured in physical
terms such as numbers of aircraft per wing, numbers of
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operational missiles..." This measure may not be completely
satisfactory for program elements (particularly general
purpose forces) subject to rapid acceleration and deceleration
in operations due to changing world situations. It also
does not consider the operational commitments of a program
element. As an example, it does not consider the difference
in 13 carriers with operational commitments for an average
of six months deployed as opposed to the same 13 carriers with
operational commitments for an average of seven months
deployed
, with regard to inputs or output.
These observations appear to be particularly relevant to
the low coefficients of correlation computed in Section IV. B.,
e.g. from Appendix F, the large increase in OMN allocated
for carriers in 1968, a year of high carrier activity in
Southeast Asia, in the presence of a slight cut imposed in
overall OMN by the Congress.
The aforementioned discussion notwithstanding, the
analysis is considered as supportive of Ruefli ' s conclusion
that under the present organization of the Department of
Defense, the plans made on a program basis can and in fact
have been changed by the resource allocation process, even
though these changes may not be organizationally grounded.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Two areas appear to hold particular promise for further
research effort. The first is the area of analysis similar
to this but on different program elements. As noted earlier
both the program and service budgets may be sensitive to
international events, and during the period from which data
was extracted, carrier budgets (particularly the service
budget) may have been significantly influenced by the ever
changing situation in Southeast Asia. A similar analysis
conducted on a program element from Major Program I, Strate-
gic Forces, such as Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines may
yield considerable insight into how sensitive the budget
is with regard to international political/military instability.
A second fertile area for study involves an improved
output measure. This analysis utilized what was considered
to be the best of those available measures of output. It
is felt that some of the analysis and conclusions would be
more powerful had a more definitive output measure, especially
for the service budget phase, been available. In devising
improved output measures, attention should be directed to
some measure of the activity level being budgeted for.
Additional investigation might also be made into what output
measurements are actually being used . While it is apparent
from both this analysis and the literature that the preparation
of the- program budget uses force levels as an output measure,
it would be advantageous to determine if the Navy, in phase five
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of the budget process, uses either explicitly or implicitly
an activity level in conjunction with force level and what
that activity level might be.
A final suggested area of research involves examining
simultaneously substitutive program elements within a single
major program. This would provide a basis for conducting a
trade-off analysis of appropriation cuts between program
elements.
D . SUMMARY
This analysis was an investigation of the consistency
or inconsistency of resource allocation decisions on attack
carriers by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Navy at different times in the budget cycle. Section II.
discussed the background for the study. First, the theory of
program budgeting was presented as a foundation for the use
of production function analysis to investigate the consistency
of these decisions. A discussion of the defense budget cycle
was presented to specify those points in the cycle that the
decisions were to be analyzed. Previous research work by
Ruefli [17] was also discussed to provide a basis and motivation
for this paper, specifically Ruefli' s conclusion that different
decisions might be made at different points in the budget
cycle.
Section III. specified two different functional forms
of the production function, the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief
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and defined the inputs and output used in the analysis.
Section III. also contained a discussion of how the data
representing OSD and Navy decisions were extracted from
successive outputs of the Five Year Defense Plan.
Section IV. presented the results of the statistical
estimation of the parameters of the different production
functions and hypothesis testing for consistency of the OSD and
Navy resource allocation decisions. Under both functional
specifications, the hypothesis was rejected that OSD and Navy
decisions were consistent. A correlation analysis was also
performed which showed that the Navy and Congressional
percentage changes in inputs for carriers were not related.
Finally, a subjective examination of these percentage changes
indicated that the Navy may have used a different output measure,
either explicitly or implicitly, from that which the OSD decisions
were based upon.
This final section, Section V. , concluded that the decisions
made by the Navy in the allocation phase of the budget cycle
were inconsistent with the decisions made by OSD in the planning,
programming and budgeting phases. Underlying causes for the
inconsistencies were suggested as being the result of incon-
sistencies in the output measures used by OSD and the Navy,
the time lag between the decisions during periods of international
political/military instability, and the possibly downward
inelasticity of defense force levels.
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APPENDIX A Defense Programs and Appropriations
I. Major programs:
O(Zero) - Support of Other Nations
I - Strategic Forces
II - General Purpose Forces
III - Intelligence and Communications
IV - Airlift and Sealift
V - Guard and Reserve Affairs
VI - Research and Development
VII - Central Supply and Maintenance
VIII - Training, Medical and Other Personnel Activities
IX - Administration and Associated Activities
II. Navy Appropriations:
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy RDTEN
Procurement Aircraft and Missiles, Navy PAMN
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy SCN
Other Procurement, Navy OPN
Military Construction, Navy MCON
Military Personnel, Navy MPN
Reserve Personnel, Navy RPN
Operations and Maintenance, Navy OMN
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APPENDIX B Program Element Summary Data
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TOTAL TOA 50,000 444,2001404,027 240,172 374,165
MANPOWER
MILITARY 169 1,248 4,044
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APPENDIX C Aircraft Carrier Tonnage Conversion









APPENDIX D Military Price Indices













APPENDIX F Appropriation Percentage Changes
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APPENDIX G Omitted Variables
Suppose that the output from the production process was
not a single entity but in fact was a combination of various
components. The production function would then relate the
various inputs to the combination of output elements.
One possible multi-output specification would be:







where the Q's are output components, the W's weights, the
x's are inputs, and a and 6 are elasticities.
If this were the correct specification, the parameters
would be estimated by the following:




- JlnW^ + alnx^ + 3£nx
2
+ u
In this case the omission of Q~ or any other component of
the output would tend to bias the intercept term. The esti-
mated value would be larger than appropriate.
If the measure of output were of the following form:
W, W
(3) Q1 -Q 2 = Axx x 2 e ,
the omission of Q 2 would be more complicated. To estimate the
parameters, the following transformed function would be used:
(4) £nQ
x
= [|~-fcnA] + ~ £nx
x
+ | £nx 2 + ^nQ 2 + u
51

As in the previous case, the intercept is influenced by
the unknown weight parameter. In addition the coefficients
of the input terms are biased. The coefficients are not the
output elasticities but are in fact less than the output
elasticities, since the weights are positive. Also, the
omission of Q~ would have an influence on the estimation of




in general, cause the values of the coefficients of x, and
x 2 to be biased upward. For a more complete analysis of the
omission of relevant explanatory variables, see Elements of
Econometrics by Jan Kmenta, published by MacMillan Company,
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